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Fiction, said Saul Bellow in his 1976 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, "tells us 
that for  every human being there is a diversity of  existences, that the single exis-
tence is itself  an illusion,"1 but this single existence is an illusion to which most of 
the lonely intellectual buffoons  of  his novels subscribe in their efforts  to impose 
stabilizing patterns of  ideas from  the private universe of  learning upon the 
crowded, chaotic multiverse of  contemporary reality. Perhaps the prime purveyor 
of  the single vision in Bellow's fiction  is the protagonist of  his 1970 novel Mr. 
Sammler's  Planet.  "Intellectual man had become an explaining creature," says Ar-
tur Sammler, realizing that he himself  has "a touch of  the same disease" that his 
friend  and subject H.G. Wells suffered  from:  "the disease of  the single self  explain-
ing what was what and who was who."2 In this, as in Bellow's other books, the 
pressures of  mass society force  the thinker to retreat inwards into his own private 
intellectual center, where the furious  mess of  the world can be converted into 
something he can handle, while at the same time he struggles to prevent this inward 
movement from  cutting him off  entirely from  the human community around him. 
From his intellectual eyrie Mr. Sammler, a Holocaust survivor living in New 
York, casts a cold eye—one eye, in fact—on  the life  and death of  the planet, sur-
veying at a glance an obsolete, bankrupt Western intellectual tradition (which he 
himself  is yet part of)  and laying before  us all its sinister ambiguities: Bloomsbury 
and Buchenwald, Wellsian Utopias and Auschwitz, civilization and its built-in 
barbarisms. Mr. Sammler is, importantly, a Cyclops figure,  almost blind in one eye 
as a result of  a wartime blow from  a camp guard's rifle  butt, and his impaired vi-
sion, it has been widely observed, is a fairly  obvious metaphor for  his state of 
mind.3 Sammler's eyesight, however, is an intricate trope, more complex and con-
tradictory than is immediately apparent, and it has received surprisingly little 
close investigation. The primary suggestion appears to be that he has his one see-
ing eye fixed  on events going on around him, while the other, blind eye is turned 
symbolically inwards towards introspection and analysis. But this is not quite— 
and indeed it may be the opposite of—what  Bellow actually says: "Careful  to 
guard his eyesight, he passed pages rapidly back and forth  before  his eye, the large 
forehead  registering the stimulus to his mind. The damaged left  eye seemed to turn 
in another direction, to be preoccupied separately with different  matters" (27). It is 
in fact  the damaged eye which, straining after  long sight, is turned outward, "in 
another direction"—away from  the books. This unseeing eye is still turned upon 
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the world, as if  still wanting to know what is going on there; as if  endlessly dis-
tracted and fascinated  by the violence and criminality that originally blinded it, 
though trained on a world that it cannot properly perceive. Meanwhile, the read-
ing eye, which is the real inner eye, the eye of  scholarship, is the eye that sees, 
though it has no explanation for  what it sees and is unable to order it and make it 
cohere. Bellow deliberately confuses  the issue, mixing up Sammler's two defective 
sightlines in order to indicate that his outward perception of  the world is largely 
unseeing while the inward scholarly vision which governs and conditions it is at 
best myopic. It transpires, in fact,  that both eyes—the external, observing eye and 
the informing,  intellectual eye, the eye of  the mind—are sources of  deluded percep-
tion. Sammler is buffeted  between their rival illusions, always at an erudite men-
tal distance from  reality but finally  too susceptible to the distractions of  the 
world to cultivate the scholar's pure, disinterested vision. 
Sammler sees a great deal with his one eye, whether this be construed as the 
damaged left  one or the short-sighted right one with which he ambitiously tries to 
"read" the world about him. Indeed, at times he sees, comprehensively, too much, 
and is seen seeing (by the black pickpocket whom he perversely pursues on 
crosstown buses). During the three days it takes him to cross the city to reach the 
bedside of  the dying Elya Gruner, Sammler's one-eyed, inward-looking view of  the 
world puts the reader in touch with a remarkable range of  experience and incident 
from  the teeming, tumultuous urban landscape: bizarre encounters with pickpock-
ets, a heckling student at Columbia University, the pursuit of  a stolen manuscript, 
the lunatic antics of  his own and Gruner's children. In the course of  this Odyssey 
Sammler sees many things. But this does not mean that he sees correctly: that is, 
perceptively or interpretively. The problem with the one-eyed vision, as John 
Clayton points out,4 is that it flattens,  distorts, and caricatures what it sees: it is 
not a fully  rounded but a wall-eyed view that sees selectively, registering only 
what its owner disapprovingly looks at. In this one-sided vision, for  example, 
American blacks are seen, stereotypically, as fantasy-metaphors  for  violence and 
white-envied sexual prowess. Sammler, possibly influenced  by his reading of 
Norman Mailer's 1961 essay 'The White Negro," transforms  the pickpocket into a 
Phallic Prince, the universal aim, as he puts it, being "sexual niggerhood for  every-
one" (30). Hence it is ironic that Sammler himself  half-consciously  identifies  with 
the pickpocket, reserving all his anger for  his victims, and that the thief  partly en-
courages this identification  when he corners Sammler. He takes off  his own dark 
glasses and then removes Sammler's, the protective screens by which both men keep 
out the brightness of  reality; then he directs Sammler's one-eyed gaze down onto 
his own one-eyed sexual instrument. This bizarre episode is not so much a 
Schopenhauerian expression of  the sovereignty of  sex as the seat of  the will; 
rather, it is a symbolic presentation of  the idea that Sammler's cerebral, book-fed 
consciousness is as myopic as the sexual one attributed to the black. These rival 
modes of  being are conceived in opposition—appropriately, it is indirectly Samm-
ler's fault  that the thief  is apprehended and almost killed by his son-in-law—but 
the two characters are shown to be equally ignorant, equally afflicted  by the "sin-
gleness" disease. 
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Sammler's picture of  the libidinous excesses of  the 1960s is as caricaturist as 
his portrait of  the Negro. Everyone claims "the right to be uninhibited, sponta-
neous, urinating, defecating,  belching, coupling in all positions, tripling, quadru-
pling, polymorphous, noble in being natural, primitive, combining the leisure and 
luxurious inventiveness of  Versailles with the hibiscus-covered erotic ease of 
Samoa" (28). Sammler is composing a kind of  sexual jeremiad here, in which the 
decadent romanticism of  the present decade is seen as a continuation of  the primi-
tivism that twenty years earlier had found  outlets in war and genocide, the new 
barbarism but a hangover from  the old. In this Swiftian  vision, of  1960s Yahoos 
by one just back from  the intellectual Houyhnhnms, the contemporary sexual revo-
lution is reduced to mindless promiscuous squalor. That the liberated sexual con-
sciousness of  the decade had intelligent, articulate defenders  (Marcuse, Reich, 
Norman O. Brown—all dismissed as "worthless fellows")  is not something one 
would ever guess from  Sammler's narrative tirade. The intellectual position of 
these thinkers is represented only in travestied form  by the militant "sexcremental-
ism" of  the student who obscenely interrupts Sammler's lecture at Columbia. 
In all of  this, of  course, Sammler is not the disinterested visiting conscious-
ness, the disembodied interplanetary visitor, that he makes himself  out to be. And 
if  he proves to be a rather unreliable spokesman for  the Bellovian idea of  order, it 
is precisely because he himself  has been a victim of,  and therefore  a part of,  the 
disorder and is incurably contaminated by it. Sammler believes that, as one who 
has been counted dead, he should be free  from  worldly and bodily interests, when 
the truth is that he is constantly drawn back into the human condition which so 
appalls him, his one fierce,  covetous, half-blind  eye trained upon what he is ex-
cluded from.  If  Elya has "delegated" his daughter Angela to "experience the Age for 
him" (131), then Sammler, as Clayton astutely observes,5 has also, albeit uncon-
sciously, delegated not only Angela but also his niece Margotte and his own 
daughter Shula to experience the revolutionary youth culture of  the 1960s, at sec-
ond-hand, on his behalf.  Sammler lives vicariously, even voyeuristically, through 
others, and principally through those who confess  to him their various exotic ex-
cesses and sexual fetishes  (Angela, Bruch). Why else does he return to Columbus 
Circle, even though he has been warned, for  a second time to watch the pickpocket, 
with whom he feels  himself  to inhabit "an adjoining region of  recklessness" (7)? 
For the same reason, it transpires, that he fired  a second bullet into the German 
soldier in the Zamhost Forest thirty years earlier: not to make sure that his adver-
sary was dead but to reexperience, viscerally, the ecstasy of  killing—as he says, 
to "try again for  that bliss" (114). Now, as then, he "craves an illicit repetition," for 
"in evil as in art there was illumination" (11). Sammler is reseeking that special 
Tolstoyan "moment of  truth," the lightning instant of  illumination in extremity. 
These pure experiences—the ones that the inward, reading eye of  the intellect has 
no access to and that cannot be converted into so much safe,  diverting mental mate-
rial—are the experiences that Sammler secretly hungers after.  These are the things 
that we really live by, as distinct from  the books we read and the opinions we 
hold. 
But if  Sammler's outward observing eye is but dimly perceptive, what comes 
to his mind's inner optics from  the reading eye of  scholarship is no less misguided. 
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Sammler may be right in his idea that history repeats itself,  running in cyclic orbits 
like planets, and that everything is therefore  derivative, making it impossible for 
anything original to happen. Thus the 1960s cults are seen as parodie reenact-
ments of  earlier Dionysiac models, deliberate cultivations of  false  primitivisms. 
But what he fails  to see is that his own ideas are part of  this pattern of  persistent 
repetition. After  his wartime "death" in a Polish mass-grave Sammler proceeds, in 
his second life,  to repeat the errors of  his former  existence. He continues to live ac-
cording to obsolete ideas, reassuming the position of  the withdrawn, disinterested 
Weimar-style intellectual of  the 1930s, a position which is as derivative, and as 
irresponsible, as that of  the contemporary youth cultures that he castigates, and as 
false  to modern historical reality. Sammler's one-eyed Mandarin's angle on the 
world fails  to register the fact  that by the 1960s the position of  the intellectual has 
changed. And it is precisely this obsolete position he has taken up—the standpoint 
of  the Spengler-Toynbee school of  intellectual historians—that enables him to 
forge  spurious continuities between cultures (Nazis and Hippies) which are 
twenty years and an ocean apart. 
Moreover, Sammler's ideas, so self-consciously  book-derived, tend to be the 
kind that keep humanity at bay rather than make one more intimate with it. What 
carries him in his trek across New York is not only the urge to reconfront  death 
but the purely notional pursuit of  an idea about human solidarity and the need to 
reaffirm  it with a dying man. Subsequently, he supposes that a daughter cannot 
look her father  in the eye and let him die without reconciliation and forgiveness. 
But Sammler has got this idea, like most of  his ideas, from  a book. It is, in fact, 
based on what happens to Pierre Bezukhov in War and  Peace, and is a literary no-
tion, like the idea that evil is perpetrated only by misshapen monsters like Richard 
III, not by ordinary people. It did not serve Sammler well in the Zamhost, where 
the Nazis did look you in the eye and then killed you, and it does not serve him 
now either. 
Angela Gruner does not want forgiveness  or reconciliation, and Sammler, 
pursuing some transcendent humanist ideal, a timeless absolute of  human love and 
atonement, tries to affirm  solidarity with the father  while denying it to the daugh-
ter, whom he can only insult. In trying to realize a theoretic notion of  solidarity 
with the dying, Sammler violates what solidarity he still has left  with the living. It 
is no accident that he is prevented from  reaffirming  his spiritual bond with Elya 
by numerous collisions with the material world on the way across New York: by 
mad capers with a stolen manuscript; a son's lunatic search for  his father's  hidden 
Mafia  money; street brawls with a pickpocket; his daughter setting fire  to his 
shoes. And it is no accident that when he arrives Elya is already dead and beyond 
his concern, so that his attention is recalled to the living. Sammler discovers, too 
late, that he has been so preoccupied by book-learned ideas about solidarity, fed 
him by the reading eye, that he misses the chance to encounter, with the observing 
eye, the thing itself  as it actually happens in the world. He has the idea but misses 
the experience. 
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